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Abstract 
This study investigates the institutional quality effect on 
population health outcomes. Explanatory variables are 
government stability, corruption, law and order, democratic 
accountability and bureaucracy quality. Whereas for the 
population health proxies are infant mortality rate and life 
expectancy. The sample of this study consist of 105 countries.  
Five years’ average data from 1984 to 2012 is taken from the 
Political Risk Services Group and World Development 
Indicators 2015. This study considers econometric techniques 
like Fixed Effects, Random Effects and GMM. Study findings 
indicate that population health is positively affected by the 
institutional quality that is increasing life expectancy and 
dropping infant mortality rate. Furthermore, GDP per capita, 
physician, and population density display a positive influence on 
life expectancy. The results propose that to achieve population 
better health outcomes, authorities must cautiously contemplate 
the quality of institutions. 
Keywords: health outcomes, institutional quality 
JEL Classification: C00, C3, I10 
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1. Introduction  
Population health is a crucial economic concern for many 
developing countries for the reason that health is one of the main 
vital contributing factor of human capital. Better health is 
fundamental to have a superior skills, efficient output and excellent 
education (Makuta & O’Hare, 2015). Institutional quality plays a 
significant role in defining the population health status. It is believed 
that lower quality of institution leads to poor health in terms of 
higher infant mortality and lesser life expectancy. 
 Institutional quality has a substantial influence on health. As 
it is obvious that health has a main role in the whole welfare of a 
nation, therefore it is crucial to have a better quality of institutions. 
Majority of previous studies on health focus on public spending, 
governance quality, corruption in health organization and 
democracy (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, & Yared, 2005; Besley 
& Kudamatsu, 2006; Filmer & Pritchett, 1999; Govindaraj & 
Rannan-Eliya, 1994). It is noticed that there are rare studies which 
emphasis on health effects of institutional quality  (Dhrifi1, 2018; 
Knowles & Owen, 2010). Considering the literature, this study aims 
to look at the institutional quality impact on health. It is 
hypothesized that population health is positively influenced by the 
good quality of institutions.  
 To achieve the objective of study, panel data from 105 
countries are analyzed. Population health outcomes are measured by 
two variables, i.e. infant mortality rate and life expectancy. Quality 
of institution is measured by “corruption, law and order, 
bureaucratic quality, government effectiveness and democracy”. 
The end goal of this study is to provide useful insight to both 
economists and healthcare officials. 
The rest of the study is planned as follows. Following the 
introduction, section two presents the literature review. The data and 
methodology of the study are discussed in section three. Results and 
discussions are the main thrust of section four. Finally, section five 
provides policy implications and conclusion. 
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2. Literature Review 
The literature regarding the institutional quality impact on health is 
inadequate. However, some studies have investigated the effect of 
governance quality on health outcome. For instance, (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, Robinson, & Yared, 2005; Besley & Kudamatsu, 2006; 
Govindaraj, & Rannan-Eliya, 1994) indicate that people enjoy good 
results show that health expenditures have a negative effect on infant 
mortality with the inclusion of governance indicators. It means 
lower corruption leads to a reduction in infant mortality and raise in 
life expectancy. The findings suggest that without lowering the level 
of corruption, it is impossible to achieve Millennium Development 
Goals of lowering infant mortality and raising life expectancy4. 
 Recently, Makuta and O’Hare (2015) examine the 
relationship between public spending on health and quality of 
governance. In the same way, sub-Saharan African 43 countries 
have been estimated over the period 1996-2011 by two-stage least 
squares regression. They find that good governance improves the 
positive impact of public spending on health and such impact is 
larger in those countries where the quality of governance is higher. 
It represents that an increase in public spending reduces infant 
mortality and increases life expectancy sharply as compared to other 
countries having poor quality of governance.  
 Moreover, Nadpara and Samanta (2015) scrutinize the 
corruption impact on population health. Estimations are grounded 
on 30 countries over the period 1996-2011. Health status is 
measured by two reliable measurements; “life expectancy (at birth) 
and infant mortality (per 1000 live births)”. Two categories of 
corruption are considered; “corruption without theft” which 
decreases the quantity of medical services5. “Corruption with theft” 
which decreases the quality and efficiency of medical service6. The 
                                                          
4“The United Nations Millennium Development Goals are eight goals that all 191 UN member states 
have agreed to try to achieve by the year 2015. The United Nations Millennium Declaration, signed 
in September 2000 commits world leaders to combat poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, 
environmental degradation, and discrimination against women.  
5 In this method, medical provider charges the bribe with official price for medical service. The 
provider transfer price to official account of treasury and keep bribes with himself. In fact, inclusion 
of bribe increases the cost of medical services and higher prices are not affordable by poor”. 
6 “In this case provider charges, only official price for the services and does not transfer price to official 
account of treasury rather keeps all the money with him. Under this method of corruption, cost of 
medical service remains low and less price is affordable for the customers”. 
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results indicate that health is badly affected by corruption in poor 
developing countries than in developed countries. However, good 
governance focusing on the implementation of law and order 
improves health outcomes7.  
 Similarly, another study by Adindu (2010) states that 
hospital managers are found to be involved in corruption. They 
miss-utilize8 hospital equipment and infrastructure for private 
purpose. The study highlights that all the members of staff at the 
hospital, including doctors and nurses, are corrupt. Doctors divert 
the patient from government hospitals to private hospitals to 
maximize their return. Overall poor management of organizations 
and departments are responsible for the corruption in the health 
sector. The above discussion reveals that previous studies have 
considered the impact of governance quality and public health 
expenditures on health.  
3. Methodology and Data 
To meet the objective of this study, we are considering institutional 
quality instead of governance quality. To measure institutional 
quality, this study prefers political risk index of International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) over Gastil index and civil liberties 
indexes. ICRG is first used by (Hall & Jones, 1999; Knack & Keefer, 
1995) arguing that these indicators of institutional quality determine 
property right and contractual right better than Gastil index and civil 
liberties indexes. Moreover, Gastil index and civil liberties indexes 
have multiple dimensions which do not truly represent institutional 
quality. The ICRG index is consist of 12 variables and ranges from 
0 to 100. Higher values show the high quality of institutions. Using 
ICRG index, this study considers “corruption, law and order, 
bureaucratic quality, government effectiveness and democracy” to 
measure institutional quality. These indicators have been frequently 
utilized in the literature as a proxy of institutional quality (Chong & 
Gradstein, 2007; Knack & Keefer, 1995; Hall & Jones, 1999; Perera 
                                                          
7“They applied two structural equations with life expectancy being the dependent variable in the first 
equation and infant mortality rate being the dependent variable for the second equation”. 
8 “Corruption in health care cuts across the board involving almost everyone in the organization,  
however,  the most corrupt in my opinion are the hospital managers who collect allocation for hospital 
equipment and other infrastructure but will not make them available  but rather divert them for personal 
purpose”. 
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& Lee, 2013; Majeed & Gillani, 2017) is measured by infant 
mortality rate and life expectancy. These two variables are the most 
appropriate and accurate variables for measuring health outcomes 
(Beckfield, 2004; Babones, 2008; Ram, 2006; Nadpara & Samanta, 
2015; Majeed & Khan, 2019; Majeed & Liaqat, 2019). First, we 
check the impact of the independent variable (that is institutional 
quality) on life expectancy. Then we regress infant mortality on the 
independent variable. A country with healthier health will have a 
low infant mortality rate and higher life expectancy. It is expected 
that if an independent variable is positively associated with life 
expectancy, the same variable would be negatively associated with 
an infant mortality rate (Nadpara & Samanta, 2015). 
For a detailed analysis, the study has used some control 
variables, for instance, primary care physicians, agriculture value-
added, GDP per capita and public expenditure. It means that people 
with enough physicians will have improved health condition than 
few primary care physicians, for calculation we are taking physician 
per 1000 inhabitant. We have used agriculture value-added as well. 
Because, well-known agriculture performant is compulsory for the 
attainment of Health Millennium Development Goals. Public 
expenditures are also considered because they have a significant 
impact on health status. These variables have also been utilized by 
various previous studies (Asafu-Adjaye, 2008; Chong & Calderon, 
2000; Drabo, 2010; Majeed & Ajaz, 2018; Nadpara & Samanta, 
2015). The details of all dependent, independent and control 
variables are given in Table 1. The changes in institutional variables 
from year to year are very small (Chong & Calderon, 2000; Perera 
& Lee, 2013). So it is appropriate to use the Random Effects Model 
instead of the Fixed Effects Model  (FEM). To see the robustness of 
results, this study estimates other econometric technique 
Generalized Method of Movements (GMM) using the following 
equations. 
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐 + 𝛼2𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑥𝑖𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑡                        (𝟏) 
 Where inst represents institutional quality. Now we write the 
equation of health status considering all these variables.   
 
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐 + 𝛼2𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                   (𝟐) 
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𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐 + 𝛼2𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                 (𝟑) 
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐 + 𝛼2𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                               (𝟒) 
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                 (𝟓) 
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐 + 𝛼2𝑏𝑞𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                   (𝟔) 
 Following previous studies (Rodgers, 1979; Babones, 2008; 
Beckfield, 2004; Flegg, 1982; Pampel & Pillai, 1986), health is 
measured by life expectancy and infant mortality rate.  
𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐 + 𝛼2𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                           (𝟕) 
𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0+𝛽1𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                       (𝟖) 
 Description of symbols are given in Table 1. The sample 
composed of 105 countries among them, 28 are developed, and 77 
are developing countries.  Five years’ average data is used from 
1984 to 2012. It is because that changes from year to year are very 
small for institutional variables (Chong & Calderon, 2000; Perera & 
Lee, 2013). The time frame of our sample is based on data 
availability of “International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)”. Name 
of Countries are given in Appendix Table A9. The data are collected 
from two sources. Data for health variables and control variables are 
taken from World Development Indicator (WDI 2015) database. 
Political risk index of “International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)” 
as a measure of institutional quality is taken from the Political Risk 
Services (PRS) Group. 
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Table 1. Variable Description 
1. Dependent Variables: Health Outcomes 
Variable Symbol Description of Variable 
Expected 
sign 
Life Expectancy 
at Birth 
le 
The years that newborn baby will live. It 
summarizes the mortality over life course 
Negative  
Infant Mortality 
Rate 
mor 
The possibility of new born baby in a year 
dying before getting the age of one. 
Positive  
2. Independent Variables: Institutional Quality 
Variable Symbol 
Description of 
Variable 
Measurem
ent Scale 
Description of 
Measurement 
Scale 
Government  
Stability 
gs 
Government 
capability is to do its 
affirmed programs 
and to stay in office. 
0 to 12  
0 = unstable and 
weak government  
12= indicates stable 
and strong 
government. 
2.2. Corruption cor 
Valuation of 
corruption inside the 
political system 
0 to 6 
Lower value of 
corruption indicates 
high corruption in 
that country and 
vice versa. 
Law and Order law 
The law measure 
“strength and 
impartiality of the 
legal system” and 
the Order is 
estimated using the 
“popular observance 
of the law”. 
0 to 6 
6 score shows fair 
lawful system and 
more public 
truthfulness to rules. 
Democratic  
Accountability 
dem 
It measures how 
government is quick 
to respond to its 
people. 
0 to 6 
High score means, 
government is 
highly reactive and 
exposed to the 
people means strong 
democracy 
Bureaucratic  
Quality 
bq 
measurement of 
tendency that 
minimizes the 
revisions of policy 
when governments 
altere. 
0 to 4 
More points are 
assigned to 
countries where the 
bureaucracy has the 
strong point and 
knowledge to 
govern without 
severe changes in 
policy or in 
government services 
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Institutional Quality  
Political risk index of “International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) “is used as institutional quality”. 
The ICRG index is consist of 12 variables and ranges from 0 to 100. Higher values show high 
quality of institutions. In our study, we have taken five variables, i.e. “corruption, law and order, 
bureaucratic quality, government effectiveness and democracy”.  
Control Variables  
GDP per capita  
“Lag of GDP per capita is taken as a measure previous income of 
individual, as health of an individual depends upon his/her previous 
income  
Public expenditure  
Public expenditure on health, it is expected that expenditure on health 
have a positive impact on population’s health 
Agriculture value-
added 
Agriculture contributes to reduced child mortality indirectly by 
increasing diversity of food production and making more resources 
available to manage childhood illnesses.  
Primary care 
physicians 
Primary care is characterized by the supply of physicians and medical 
specialist. For that we are using physician per 1000 inhabitant”.  
4. Results and Discussions 
Statistical results in Table A1 (see Appendix) show that the average 
score of our sample is 4.05. The country having the highest ICRG 
index (6.6) is Luxembourg. While, the country Serbia and 
Montenegro are with the lowest index (0.636). Cross country 
analysis helps to understand that the developed countries have a high 
ICRG index (6.6) whereas developing countries have the highest 
institutional quality indexes (5.92).   
 In our sample, infant mortality rate and average life 
expectancy for all countries are 67 years and 38 per 1,000 life 
expectancy. Between the developed countries, highest life 
expectancy (83) has been found in Hong Kong, and Iceland has the 
lowest infant mortality (1.6). In contrast, among developing 
countries, the highest life expectancy is 79.7 in Costa Rica and 
lowest infant mortality is 4 in Bolivia. 
 The estimated results of Fixed Effects Regression are given 
in Table A2. The first column shows the institutional quality has a 
significant positive influence on life expectancy. That is one unit 
rise in institutional quality increase life expectancy by 1.17 years. 
All other variables of institutional quality except corruption are 
positively correlated with life expectancy. It means less corruption 
leads to high life expectancy. Column (4) shows that with one unit 
increase in democracy rises life expectancy by 0.7 years. The 
positive impact of democracy on health is consistent with the 
findings of studies (Govindaraj & Rannan-Eliya, 1994; Acemoglu, 
Johnson, Robinson, & Yared, 2005; Besley & Kudamatsu, 2006). 
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Democracy is positively associated with the services such as supply 
of clean water, health care facilities and better nutrition. On average, 
institutional quality is positively related to the life expectancy 
(Lewis, 2006; Makuta & O’Hare, 2015; Rajkumar & Swaroop, 
2008; Lin, Chien, Chen, & Chan, 2014). The opposite results are 
found for infant mortality. Table A3 shows that institutional quality 
and infant mortality are negatively associated with each other. 
Column (1) helps to interpret that one unit increase in institutional 
quality decreases infant mortality by 8.4 per 1,000 live births. All 
control variables such as a number of physician and population 
density are positively related to the life expectancy. The coefficient 
on GDP per capita in Table A2 column (1) is interpreted as 1$ 
increase in previous income increases the life expectancy in the 
current year by 0.0001 year. These findings are similar to the 
(Asafu-Adjaye, 2008; Drabo, 2010). Countries with higher GDP per 
capita have more resources and monetary fund to spend on health 
care and medical services (Nadpara & Samanta, 2015). Contrary, all 
these control variables are negatively related to infant mortality rate.  
 Considering the limitation of Fixed Effects model that is 
time-invariant and intercept is same for all the countries, the study 
also utilizes Random Effects Model which intercept contains time-
invariant country specific characteristics. The random component is 
a deviation from the mean value of intercept. This is also called the 
Error Component Model (ECM). The second limitation of Fixed 
Effects Model is the loss of a degree of freedom. Random Effects 
Model also deals with this problem. Table A4 shows that 
institutional quality coefficient is significant in all six models, and 
it has a positive relationship with life expectancy. In addition, 
control variables that include the lag of GDP per capita, physicians 
and population density are significant and positively related to life 
expectancy. Countries with better health measures and initial 
endowment have better health status (Drabo, 2010). The effect of 
institutional quality on life expectancy is given in column (1) Table 
A4. The coefficient of institutional quality is significant and 
positively related to life expectancy. That is one unit increase in 
institutional quality increases life expectancy by 1.2 years at 1% 
level of significance. All other institutional variables except 
corruption are positively related to life expectancy. It is estimated 
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that one unit rise in democracy increases life expectancy by 0.8 
years. Moreover, column 5 Table A5 shows that one unit increase in 
democracy decreases infant mortality by 5.7 per 1,000 live births. It 
is interpreted that the democratic government is more responsive to 
the people’s needs and wants to build trust among the population for 
the next election process. Majority of the population are in favor of 
health care programs, considering their preference, the government 
make reforms in the health care sector. These reforms lead to better 
health outcomes that is low infant mortality and high life expectancy 
(Nadpara & Samanta, 2015). The coefficient of corruption is 
negative and significant (see Table A4 column 3). It indicates that 
one unit increase in corruption decreases life expectancy by 0.5 
years. Corruption high value indicates less corruption in that 
country. It means that less corrupted country has a high life 
expectancy. Same is found for infant mortality that is shown in 
Table A5 column 3. One unit increase in corruption increases infant 
mortality by 3.4 per 1,000 live births. Corruption’s adverse effect on 
health status is consistent with various previous studies (Adindu, 
2010; Nadpara & Samanta, 2015). Corruption occurs due to weak 
governance, poor accountability system and law & order. In health 
organization corruption set the ground for the lack of basic 
infrastructures and necessary medicines that consequence in 
dropping the quantity and quality of health care services (Adindu, 
2010; Nadpara & Samanta, 2015). 
 The law and order coefficient indicates that 1 unit increase 
in law and order causes an increase in life expectancy by 0.42 years. 
This means a country with high law and order have low corruption 
and better health status (Nadpara & Samanta, 2015). Coefficient of 
government stability determines that one point increase in 
government stability increases life expectancy by 0.27 years. 
Indeed, more stable and legislative government leads to better health 
outcomes. Consequently, policies regarding health care increase 
health outcomes (Nadpara & Samanta, 2015). The coefficient of 
bureaucracy shows that one unit increase in bureaucracy increases 
life expectancy by 2.4 years. 
  In this study, the use of panel data can generate the problem 
of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Secondly, there is a 
possibility of reverse causality between health and institutions. That 
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inverse causality is also known as endogeneity. In order to tackle 
endogeneity and heteroscedasticity, we have estimated our model 
by Generalized Method of Moment (GMM). The results are shown 
in Table A6. The coefficient of institutional quality is significant and 
positively related to life expectancy. The empirical result implies 
that with one unit increase in institutional quality, the life 
expectancy increases by 1.73 years. All other variables of 
institutional quality are found with a positive sign and significant. 
The coefficient of corruption shows that one unit rise in corruption 
causes 0.1 years rise in life expectancy. Similarly, the coefficient of 
bureaucracy quality and law and order show a significant positive 
impact on life expectancy. This means a country with high law and 
order have low corruption and better health status (Nadpara & 
Samanta, 2015). The coefficient of bureaucracy shows that one unit 
increase in bureaucracy increases life expectancy by 0.4 years.  
Additionally, the coefficient of government stability defines 
that life expectancy rise by 0.06 years as one point government 
stability increase. Similarly, the law and order coefficient indicates 
that 1 unit rise in law and order causes the life expectancy increased 
by 0.44 years. Democracy has a significant positive impact on life 
expectancy (shown in Table A6 column 4). It is concluded that 
institutional quality has a significant positive effect on a population 
health outcome that is raising life expectancy and dropping infant 
mortality rate.  The control variables like physicians, GDP per capita 
and population density show positive effect on life expectancy. As 
1$ increase in previous GDP per capita the life expectancy increases 
by 7.5 years. In the same way, the coefficient of physician states that 
one unit increase in a number of physicians, the life expectancy 
increases by 4.1 years. The supply of physicians characterizes 
primary care. Population with more primary care physicians will 
have well health status than population having lesser primary care. 
5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendation 
Institutional quality plays a critical role in determining the health 
status of a society. The findings reveal that institutional quality is an 
essential element of health status. The estimated results show that 
institutional variables like “democracy, government stability, 
bureaucratic quality and law & order” have a significant positive 
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impact on health status. Besides this, it is found that in health 
organization corruption origins the shortage of basic infrastructures 
and medicines which as a result pull down the health care services 
quality and quantity. Overall, the impact of institutional quality on 
population health is positive.  If a country attains great institutional 
quality, the health status of its populations will be enhanced. 
Without having good institutional quality, it is impossible to achieve 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The findings suggest 
that officials must give additional consideration to institutional 
quality to obtain improved health outcomes. The provision of 
sanitation, clean water and vaccination should be ensured to 
improve health status. Further research can explore the time series 
element of institutional data to scrutinize the relationship between 
institutional quality and population health outcomes.  
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Summary Statistics of Full Sample  
Variables Observation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Full Sample  
2. ICRG index  
Government Stability 
Corruption 
Law and Order 
Democratic 
Accountability 
Bureaucratic Quality 
Average of Institutions  
 
2850 
2834 
2834 
2834 
 
2834 
2856 
 
7.621 
3.057 
3.625 
3.938 
 
2.136 
4.054 
 
2.077 
1.315 
1.449 
1.529 
 
1.142 
1.100 
 
1 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0.636 
 
12 
6 
6 
6 
 
4 
6.6 
3. Health Variables 
Life Expectancy 
Infant Mortality 
 
3031 
3013 
 
67.218 
38.982 
 
10.168 
36.344  
 
35.792 
1.6 
 
 83.480 
170.9 
4. Control Variables  
GDP per capita 
Agriculture Value added 
Physician  
Population growth 
Population density 
Public health expenditure  
 
 
2867 
2591 
 
1508 
3034 
3007 
1853 
 
 
9104.21 
15.650 
 
1.982 
1.443 
219.898 
3.641 
 
 
14300.69 
13.4610 
 
1.348 
1.269 
821.399 
1.991 
 
 
113.706 
0 
 
0.004 
-5.814 
1.204 
.009 
 
 
86129 
65.972 
 
6.167 
11.180 
7589.10 
10.094 
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Table A2:  FEM Regression of Life Expectancy and Institutions   
Variables Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp 
L.GDP per 
capita 
0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(4.92e-05)   (4.94e-05)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               (4.91e-05) (4.85e-05) (4.93e-05) (5.00e-05)
Institutions 
1.171***      
(0.261)      
Physician 
2.000*** 1.938*** 1.803*** 2.118*** 2.087*** 2.239*** 
(0.486) (0.492) (0.493) (0.479) (0.489) (0.494) 
Pop. Density 
0.002 0.002 0.003** 0.003** 0.002* 0.002* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Govt Stability 
 0.331***     
 (0.080)     
Corruption 
  -0.938***    
  (0.205)    
Democracy 
   0.739***   
   (0.150)   
Bureaucracy  
    1.021***  
    (0.278)  
Law & Order 
     0.368* 
     (0.192) 
Constant 
57.92*** 60.34*** 66.29*** 59.80*** 60.58*** 61.16*** 
(1.208) (0.841) (1.073) (0.854) (0.844) (0.956) 
Observations 442 442 442 442 442 442 
R-squared 0.243 0.237 0.245 0.252 0.229 0.206 
Number of 
code 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3:  FEM regression of Infant Mortality and Institutional 
Quality 
Variables 
Inf 
Mortality 
Inf 
Mortality 
Inf 
Mortality 
Inf 
Mortality 
Inf 
Mortality 
Inf 
Mortality 
L.GDP per capita 
6.20e-05 4.40e-05 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutions 
-8.419***      
(1.330)      
Physician 
-8.477*** -7.441*** -6.624*** -9.331*** -10.18*** -10.24*** 
(2.469) (2.451) (2.462) (2.417) (2.591) (2.570) 
Pop. Density 
-0.006 -0.005 -0.014** -0.012** -0.001 -0.010* 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.0061) (0.006) 
Govt Stability 
 -2.872***     
 (0.401)     
Corruption 
  7.553***    
  (1.022)    
Democracy 
   -5.365***   
   (0.757)   
Bureaucracy  
    -2.922**  
    (1.477)  
Law & Order 
     -2.539** 
     (1.001) 
Constant 
84.23*** 69.97*** 20.55*** 70.76*** 56.92*** 60.39*** 
(6.167) (4.199) (5.340) (4.290) (4.465) (4.963) 
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440 
R-squared 0.166 0.191 0.197 0.188 0.077 0.084 
Standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A4. REM regression of Life Expectancy and Institutions   
Variables Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp 
L.GDP per capita 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(3.66e-05) (3.72e-05) (3.73e-05) (3.65e-05) (3.65e-05) (3.74e-05) 
Institutions 
1.220***      
(0.250)      
Physician 
2.914*** 2.990*** 3.024*** 3.024*** 2.984*** 3.088*** 
(0.372) (0.377) (0.380) (0.367) (0.367) (0.378) 
Pop. Density 
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Govt Stability 0.279*** 
 (0.079)     
Corruption 
  -0.507***    
  (0.189)    
Bureaucracy  
   1.245***   
   (0.265)   
Democracy 
    0.804***  
    (0.148)  
Law & Order 
     0.422** 
     (0.184) 
Constant 
56.46*** 59.07*** 62.71*** 58.82*** 58.18*** 59.64*** 
(1.233) (0.985) (1.043) (0.899) (0.951) (1.014) 
Observations 442 442 442 442 442 442 
Number of code 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table A5:  REM regression of Infant Mortality and Institutions   
Variables Inf 
Mortality 
Inf 
Mortality 
Inf 
Mortality 
Inf 
Mortality 
                 Inf 
            Mortality 
Inf 
Mortality 
L.GDP per 
capita 
6.01e-05 -0.000 -0.000 2.69e-05    7.15e-05 -4.51e-05 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutions -9.200***      
 (1.219)      
Physician -12.43*** -12.78*** -13.43*** -13.50***     -12.65*** -13.36*** 
 (1.444) (1.496) (1.530) (1.444)      (1.435) (1.504) 
Pop. Density -0.005 -0.00435 -0.006** -0.005*     -0.008*** -0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)      (0.003) (0.003) 
Govt Stability  -2.597***     
  (0.395)     
Corruption   3.405***    
   (0.920)    
Bureaucracy     -5.481***   
    (1.310)   
Democracy             -5.737***  
              (0.721)  
Law & Order      -3.303*** 
      (0.913) 
Constant 93.57*** 78.21*** 49.50*** 69.18***         79.59*** 70.11*** 
 (5.248) (4.065) (4.050) (3.453)          (3.713) (4.017) 
Observations 440 440 440 440            440 440 
Number of 
code 
102 102 102 102            102 102 
Standard errors in parentheses    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Table A6: GMM regression of Life Expectancy and 
Institutional Quality 
Variables Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp 
Institutions 1.739***      
 (0.588)      
L.GDP per 
capita 
7.58e-05*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 7.44e-05*** 3.60e-05 0.000*** 
 (2.83e-05) (2.03e-05) (3.00e-05) (2.11e-05) (2.48e-05) (2.57e-05) 
Physician 4.179*** 4.361*** 4.404*** 3.924*** 4.082*** 4.295*** 
 (0.306) (0.300) (0.304) (0.292) (0.279) (0.322) 
Pop. Density 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Govt. Stability  0.067     
  (0.260)     
Corruption   0.104    
   (0.406)    
Democracy    1.723***   
    (0.406)   
Bureaucracy      2.441***  
     (0.482)  
Law & Order      0.447 
      (0.376) 
Constant 53.32*** 58.98*** 59.17*** 53.79*** 55.69*** 58.16*** 
 (2.223) (2.094) (1.124) (1.548) (0.955) (1.222) 
Observations 432 432 432 432 432 432 
R-squared 0.593 0.577 0.578 0.598 0.620 0.580 
Hansen J. Test 0.10 0.47 0.41 0.36 0.26 0.39 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A7: System GMM Regression for Life Expectancy and 
Institutions (Developed Countries) 
Variables Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp 
  Institutions -0.354      
 (0.432)      
  L.GDP per capita 0.0001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 8.59e-05*** 9.90e-05*** 0.000*** 
 (1.91e-05) (1.30e-05) (1.67e-05) (1.37e-05) (1.87e-05) (2.01e-05) 
  Physician 1.001*** 1.152*** 0.650** 1.179*** 1.232*** 0.851*** 
 (0.278) (0.250) (0.311) (0.256) (0.266) (0.304) 
   Pop. Density 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
   Govt. Stability  -0.039 
(0.145) 
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  Corruption   -0.560**    
   (0.243)    
 Democracy    1.391**   
    (0.642)   
 Bureaucracy     0.372  
     (0.558)  
 Law & Order      -0.644 
      (0.406) 
Constant 73.15*** 71.40*** 74.58*** 63.61*** 69.69*** 74.89*** 
 (2.521) (1.248) (1.759) (3.583) (2.060) (2.463) 
Observations 113 113 113 113 113 113 
R-squared 0.430 0.425 0.433 0.395 0.423 0.431 
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A8: System GMM Regression for Life Expectancy and 
Institutions (Developing Countries) 
Variables Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp Life Exp 
Institutions 1.162      
 (0.758)      
L.GDP per 
capita 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Physician 3.811*** 3.808*** 3.844*** 3.859*** 3.943*** 3.796*** 
 (0.415) (0.423) (0.420) (0.392) (0.398) (0.423) 
Pop. Density 0.0143*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.0132*** 0.0145*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
 
Govt. 
Stability 
  
0.133  
(0.283) 
    
Corruption   -0.018    
   (0.632)    
Democracy    0.933**   
    (0.475)   
Bureaucracy      1.625***  
     (0.603)  
Law & Order      0.254 
      (0.429) 
Constant 52.02*** 
(2.780) 
55.07*** 56.08*** 53.21*** 53.87*** 55.29*** 
 (2.336) (1.634) (1.636) (1.076) (1.444) 
Observations 319 319 319 319 319 319 
R-squared 0.471 0.460 0.461 0.468 0.488 0.464 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A9: A List of Countries 
Algeria    
Angola                              
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Belarus  
Belgium 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Cameroon 
Chile  
China 
Colombia  
Congo  
Costa Rica 
Denmark 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Estonia  
Ethiopia  
Finland  
Ghana  
Greece 
France  
Gambia  
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana  
Honduras 
Hong Kong   
Hungary  
Iceland  
India  
Indonesia  
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy  
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
 Kazakhstan  
Kenya 
Kore, DPR 
Latvia  
Luxembourg  
Malawi  
Malaysia  
Mali  
Malta  
Mexico  
Moldova 
Mongolia  
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Netherlands  
New Zealand  
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway  
Pakistan  
Panama  
Paraguay  
Peru 
Philippines  
Poland  
Portugal  
Romania  
Russia  
Senegal  
Serbia & Montenegro 
Sierra Leon 
Singapore  
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Sari Lanka  
Sweden  
South Africa 
Spain  Switzerland  
Tanzania 
Thailand  
Togo  
Trinidad & Tobago  
Tunisia 
Turkey  
Uganda 
Ukraine  
Uruguay  
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen  
Zambia   
 
Appendix B 
Table B1: Multicollinearity test for Health and Institutions 
Dependent Variable Health Variables (life expectancy) 
Independent Variables VIF 1/VIF 
GDP per capita 1.83 0.546 
Institutional quality index 1.86 0.538 
Mean VIF 1.61  
 
Table B2: Heteroscedasticity Test for Health and Institutions 
White’s general test Breusch-pagan’s test for Heteroscedasticity 
p-value 0.00 p-value 0.00 
 
Table B3: Jarque Bera Test of Normality for Health and 
Institutions 
Jarque bera 2.553 Chi (2)P value 0.279 
Shapiro Wilk  Test of Normality for Health and Institutions 
Z value 2.146 P Svalue 0.015 
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Table B4: Model Specification Test  
Link Test for Health and   Institutions    
Dependent 
variable lifexpec 
Coefficient  Standard 
deviation  
t- stats Prob value  
> ltl 
Hat 1.975 0.484 4.08 0.000 
Hat-Square -.007 0.484 -2.02 0.045 
Constant -31.809 15.929   -2.00 0.047 
Ramsey RESET test for equation 
H0= Model  has no omitted variables 
F-stats= 11.81 
Prob. value > F-stats= 0.000 
Appendix C 
Table C1: Hausman Test 
Hausman Test for Health and  Institutions  
Test Statistics  
Chi-square 
Value  
22.06 
p-value 
0.001 
 
Table C2: Breusch Pagan Multiplier Test   
Breusch Pagan Multiplier Test  for Health and  Income Inequality   
 Test Statistics Value   P value 
Chi- Square 518 0.00 
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